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Abstract
This paper contains the formal proofs of the lemmas and theorems
that are reported in "Defensive Marketing Strategies: An Equilibrium
Analysis Based on Decoupled Response Function Models" by Kumar and
Sudharshan (1987).

DEFENSIVE MARKETING STRATEGIES: AN EQUILIBRIUM
ANALYSIS BASED ON DECOUPLED RESPONSE FUNCTION MODELS
Lemma 1: All existing products adjacent to the attacker will lose
some finite portion of their before entry unadjusted market demand to
a viable attacker.
Proof : Viability of all products in the market dictates that the
following conditions be satisfied (shown in Lane 1980, Appendix 1).
If one or more of these conditions is not satisfied, then it is
possible for a product to be dominated by its competitors and hence
capture _no part of the market (Lane (1980)).
Viability conditions:
Condition 1: z. (Y-p.) > z, (Y-p, ) for all k > j (1)
j j k k
Condition 2: w. (Y-p.) < w (Y-p, ) for all k > j (2)
j j k k
Condition 3: for all i and k s.t. i < j < k, there exists a
customer a who is indifferent between products i and k,
that is U_(v , z^ pi )
= U_(w
k
,
z
k , pk )
(3)
which implies U_(w. , z
, p.) > U_(w , z , p.) (4)
a J J J a*-*- 1
(with z > z, , w < w, , f < f, for all j < k)
j k j k j k
Let the attacker [product (N+l)] enter the market and be viable
after all competitive adjustments have been made. The new product
(N+l) can be positioned either (i) between two existing products, or
(ii) at either extreme. We consider each of these cases separately.
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Case 1
For attack at this position to be viable, the attacker's price is
governed by Equation (4) with i=L, j = L + 1 and k being the index
for the attacker.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function form provides unique indifferent
customers (1) a between brands L and L + 1 before entry, (2) a
l_l Li 1
between brands L and (N+l), (3) cl_ between (N+l) and (L+l). Clearly,
a . * a * a and Condition 3 of viability implies ou. < a < a -
proving the lemma.
Case 2
In this case, viability equations (1) and (2) dictate that the
consumers whose taste parameters lie between the attacker and its
closest edge of the taste distribution domain (either to N+l, or N+l
to 1), prefer the attacker. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Note that this loss in share by the defenders upon viable attack
is in terms of unadjusted demand and does not consider the effects of
advertising and distribution.
*
Lemma 2 : Let p., i = 1, 2, ..., N be the optimal Nash price equi-
*
librium prices of N brands. Let 8 , i = 1 , 2, . .
.
,
N be their cor-
responding unadjusted market shares. Let another brand enter this
market. In the ensuing equilibrium let p., i = 1, 2, ..., N be the
optimal Nash equilibrium prices, and 8. » i = 1. 2,...,N be the
corresponding unadjusted market shares for the incumbent brands. For
any existing brand j
-3-
pj >pj
implies that
*
8. > 6..
J - J
Proof :
The first order condition (for profit maximization) for any
existing product j with respect to its price is given by
3tt. 30.
T-1 - (B + (p.'-c) T--1 ) MA(k .)D(k .) =
3p. J J 3p. aj dj
(5)
* *
The pre-entry optimal price and market share for product j (p. and 8.
respectively) must satisfy
36.
8. + (p.-c) t—J
J J 3P,
= (6)
j
Notice that this equation assumes that the prices of all the other
brands are at their pre-entry Nash equilibrium levels.
We know (from Lane 1980, Equations (4)-(8)) that
3 Pj R Vl >< Y-p.
j=2,3,...,N-l (7)
38.
3Pi
36,
3p,
f-
Y"P
1
ln(~)
1
1—
<-yV>
N-l
(8)
(9)
-4-
f ... f.
where R ln(-J—-) InC-p1-)
J j-1
j=2,3,...,N-l (10)
f. --L
,
j-1, 2,..
.
,N (11)
and f
j >
f
J-l'
j-2,3,... ,N (12)
Similarly the post-entry optimal price and market share for product j
(p. and 8. respectively) satisify
36.
i, + (p.-c) t—L
2 J 3 P
= (13)
p
j
Note that this assumes that the prices of all the other brands are at
their post-entry Nash equilibrium levels, p and 8. also satisfy
Equations (7) to (9) with a total of (N+l) products in the market, the
attacker denoted as brand (N+l), and for any incumbent brand j, j 1,
2, ..., N, one of its immediate neighbors j - 1 or j + 1 could be brand
N + l.
From Equations (6) and (13),
!i _<P£! )
36
1
3p.
1± (14)
*
,
* x 36
[ (P -c) _
J J 3p
j
P
J
k^ ( Pl -c) (Y-?1 )
k* (p*-c )(Y-Pl )
(15)
-5-
*
where k. and k. are parameters dependent on the position of brand i
3 2
and its immediate neighbor(s) after and before attack, respectively.
To prove this lemma, we need to consider four cases of the rela-
tive positioning between brand j and the attacker. For any given
incumbent product j, it can be:
Case A : It is not an immediate neighbor of (N+l). That is, its
immediate neighbors remain unchanged after entry.
Case B : j = 1 and its left immediate neighbor is brand N+l after
entry.
Case C : j = N and its right immediate neighbor is brand N+l after
entry.
Case D : The attacker (N+l) is adjacent to j and to one other incumbent
brand.
Case A :
* i Vik = k - - ln(^—
)
j = 2, 3, ..., N - 1
J J j_i
* 1
lnC-^)
r
l
* 1
and k, = k. = - i = N
InC-jA-)
N-l
From Equation (15), if p > p it follows that 6. > 6. and if
J - p* then B = 8*.
-6-
Case B:
f
2lnCj^—
)
N+l
k, =
1 f f
lnC-r1)' InC-—-)
1 N+l
* 1
and k, =
1 f
2
ln(-^)
*1
By assumption of the position of brand (N+l) to the left of brand 1,
f
N+ l <
C
l <
f 2-
This implies that —; > 1.
k
i
From Equation (15), if p > p it follows that 8. > 8
Case C :
f
ln(-p )
N-l
k.,
N
i rfg±Li i / N nln(^ ) ln(^ )
N N-l
* 1
and k
N f
Nln(-^—
N-l
By assumption of the position of brand (N+l) to the right of brand
N
- Vi < £ N < £N+r
-7-
This implies that -5- > 1.
k
N
From Equation (15), if pN _> PN then 6N > 8N<
Case D ; Since the attacker has two immediate neighbors j and j + 1, we
consider:
i) Brand j, j=l , 2, . . . , N-l
ln(-^ )
j-l
k. = - - j-2,3,...,N-l
j j" 1
1
k -—— j=i
f
J
in(^)
j" 1
*
k. = j-2, 3,.. . ,N-1
lnC-1^) in(-i—
)
* 1
ln(—
)
f
.
J
By assumption of the position of brand (N+l ) between brands j and j + 1,
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f. < f. < f < fj-1 j N+l j+1
j=2,3,...,N-l
and f. < f M ,, < f.,,
J N+l j+1
j-1
Therefore for j 1,
> 1.
For j = 2,3,...,N-1
ln(-s )
k. j-1
.J. = -
* f
k
j i»(-KL)
m(Jii)
£ j-l
1
/n+1 j+1 j+1
ln(- ) + ln(jJ ) ln(jJ )
j+1 j-1 j
lB(£fiti, + ln(Ji±i) ln(!i±i)
j+i j j-i
Note that ln(-r^) < 0, ln(-~^) + ln(-r^-) > 0, and
j+1 J+1 j
f. f.
lnC-r1^) > lnC-t-1^) > 0.
j-1 j
\Therefore, —£ > 1.
From Equation (15), if p. > p. then 6. > 6..
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ii) Brand J + 1, j = 1,2,...,N-1
f
3 + 2
ln(T )
N+l
k
4 .,
=
f f
j=l,2,..,N-2
f j+l £ N+1
£«*i
-
—
r
1—
J - n-1
lnH-^)
f
N+l
in(^)
*
kj+i
—
rrz r— 3 " 1,2 N " 2
lnC_jji) ln(-i±i)
lnC-1^)
f
.
J
By assumption of the position of brand (N+l) between brands j and j + 1
fj < f N+1 < Vl < fj +2 J"' 2 N
"2
and f < f„
,
< f
,
j-N-1.
j N+l j+1 J
Therefore for j = N-l,
-*— > 1,
kj+l
and for j=l, 2, . .
.
,N-2
-10-
f
J+ 2 f. ,1+1
k
- + ,
N+l j
k
j + l In(^) In(^)
f., 9 f. f.,,
lnC-r1^) + lnC-r1—
)
lnC-r1^)
j N+l j
f.
+1 f. f. +9 •InH—^ + InC-J ) lnC-1^)
f
J
f
N+ l
f
J
f. f.., f.
Note that ln(r] ) < 0, InOr1—1 ) + lnC-r1 ) > and
N+l j N+l
ln(!i±2) > in(fl±l).
j J
ViTherefore, -»— > 1.
Vi
* *
From Equation (15), if p. > p. then 8. > 6..
J ~ J J J
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
D
Lemma 3 : Holding all other prices fixed, the unadjusted market share
of any existing product decreases (increases) with the decrease
(increase) in the price of any of its immediate neighbors and de-
creases (increases) with an increase (decrease) in its own price,
i.e.,
36
JL
Vi > 0, j=2,...,N (16)
-li-
as.
t—J- > 0, j=l,...,N-l (17)
3 P
J+ 1
g g
^-j < 0, j-1 N (18)
9p
j
Proof : From Lane (1980) Equations (4) - (8)
3 8 f
• ln(-4% S-: > 0, j=2,...,N-l (19)
3pj-i R V y"pj-i
3 8 f
J-4ln(rL)v^ > 0» j=2,...,N-l (20)
Pj+1 j-1 Hj+1
36
1 1 1
ln(—
)
f
i
"
H l l
> (22)
3 ?N-1 . ,
£
N , "T S-l>
ln( )
f
N-l
38.
From Equations (7) - (9) we can see J < 0, j=l,2,...,N.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Theorem 1 : The optimal defensive pricing, for any product in a
N-product market in equilibrium and in which consumer tastes are
uniformly distributed, is the reduction of price.
Proof : The positioning of the attacker can occur as per one of the
following two cases: (1) between any two existing products L and L+l
,
or (2) at either extreme, i.e., to the left of product 1 or to the
right of product N.
-12-
Casel: Given the attacker's entry strategies as fixed, the defensive
reactions of products 1 through L are independent of those of products
L+l through N.
For products 1 through L, the defensive price change part of
Theorem 1 will be disproved only if any of the two following scenarios
occur: (A) Product L's optimal price is increased or remains
unchanged and (B) The prices of products L, L-l, ...., L-m+1 are
decreased (1 <_ m _< L-l) and product L-m's optimal price is increased
or remains unchanged.
The change in share of any product j can be written as the sum of
the changes in its share caused by the change in the strategy of each
of its immediate neighbors and that caused by the change in its own
strategy. More specifically,
36 88.
dB. = J-
1 dp. + —L dp._
1
+ Y. for j=2,3,...,N-l (23)
3 B
dB
i "i77 dp i + ,r i £or J"1 (24>
where y is the change in 8. due to a change in the strategy of product
J+l.
3B
and Yj-i
=
"Tp—^Pj-r (25)
Scenario A :
Consider product L. After attack its right adjacent product is
(N+l). Further, from Lemma 1, if (N+l) is viable then y < 0.
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Let the after entry price, p T of product L be greater than or equal
* * *
to its before entry price p , i.e. , dp = p - p _> 0. Since p _> p ,
*
from Lemma 2 (Case D), 8 T > 8. •
Or d8
L
= 6
L
- B* > 0.
In Equation (23) with j=L, we know that d8 > 0, dp
_> 0, y <
96
L
36
L
and from Lemma 3, > and -r— < 0.
3 PL-1 3P L
*
Therefore dp, , > 0. Or, p , > P
T
_,« It follows from Lemma 2 that
*
6
L-1 >
B
L-1
or d6
L-l
> 0#
From Equation (25), Y
T
_, < 0* Therefore from Equation (23), wi th
j=L-l, dp
L_ 2
> 0.
Following this line of reasoning, for product 1, dp. > 0. There-
fore, from Lemma 2, d8 , > 0. But from Equation (25) y < 0. Therefore,
Equation (24) is violated; thus, product L's price could not have
increased.
Scenario B : For some 1 <^ m j< L-l,
j =L~m+ 1 , . . . ,
L
*
Pj <pr
and v
*
PL-m ^ PL-m
Since pL_m+1 < pL-n+1 ,
i.e., dp
L_m+1
< 0, and p^ > p^, it is
*
implied that Y T < 0* Since pT > p T , i.e., dp. > 0, Lemma 2L—
m
h—m — L—
m
L—m —
*
implies that 8 T > 8. , i.e., d6 T > 0.L—m L-m L—
m
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In Equation (23) with i=L-m, dp T > 0, d6 T > 0, y T < impliesL—m — L—m L—
m
*
that dp T , > 0, i.e., p T . > p T ..r L-m-l L-m-1 L-m-1
Continuing this, brand 1 must have increased price, and this creates
the contradiction as in Case A.
Given that Scenarios A and B are impossible, the optimal prices of
products 1,2,...,L must decrease.
Following the same logic it can be seen that the optimal prices of
all the products L+l,L+2, . .
.
,N must decrease. This concludes the
proof of decrease of optimal defensive prices when the attacker enters
between any pair of existing products.
Case 2 : In this case the attacker can either enter to the right of
product N, or to the left of product 1. If it enters to the right of
product N with a fixed entry strategy, this situation is analogous to
considering the defensive reactions of products 1 through L in Case 1,
proving that the optimal prices of all the N existing products must
decrease in this situation.
Entry to the left of product 1 is analogous to considering the
defensive reactions of products L+l through N in Case 1, proving that
the optimal prices of all the N existing products must decrease in
this situation also.
This concludes the proof that the optimal defensive price strategy
is the reduction of price by every existing product.
Theorem 2 : For any existing product j under conditions of Theorem 1,
its optimal advertising and/or distribution expenditures must decrease
-15-
if the market size, M, does not increase. Otherwise, its advertising
and/or distribution expenditures must increase.
The intuition behind this theorem is simple. Because the response
functions are decoupled and concave, advertising and distribution will
decrease if the revenue, (p -c)8 M, decreases. Theorem 1 and Lemma 1
J j
cause both (p -c) and 6. to decrease hence revenue decreases. This
J J
argument and the formal proof follow that of Hauser and Shugan (1980,
Theorem 7). Our contribution is to extend the results to the case
where all defenders respond to the attacher and one another until an
equilibrium is reached.
Proof : With respect to optimal defensive advertising and distribution
strategies the following first order conditions have to be satisfied:
3*.
s
.
—-1
- = (p -c) 8 M D(k )
-J? 1-0 (26)3k
. j j dj 3k
aj J J aj
3tt.
J— = ( n -r) 8 M ACk ) -P—
-rr-i- p. c ( .)
-f3k rj j aj 3k
-1=0 (27)
dj ""dj
(Note that by choice of concave response functions the second order
conditions for a maximum are satisfied, i.e., the Hessian is negative
definite.) As shown above, upon attack, the optimal p. must decrease
(to, say, p.), as must the corresponding 8. (to 8.).
Case 1 : If (p,~c) 8.M decreases after entry, then from (26), it
follows that
3tt
.
3k < (28)
** * * .
-16-
3tt.
1
3k
dj
< (29)
** * *
(p.,k ,»k
, A )
* *
where k . and k. are the optimal pre-entry advertising and distribution
aj dj
expenditures, respectively.
This implies that if we maintain pre-entry advertising (distribu-
tion) expenditures after attack, then the distribution (advertising)
expenditures must necessarily decrease.
To analyze the effects of joint changes in advertising and distri-
bution expenditures, we note that the total derivative of tt . is given by
3tt
du
** * *
x(p.,k .,k )
J aj dj
3k
aj
3tt
dk
aj 3k
'dj
dk
dj
(p,,k .,k )
j aj dj
(30)
* *
From equations (28) and (29), we know that (k . ,k . ) is suboptimal
aj dj
** ~*
Therefore, we seek (k ,,k ) such that
aj dj
dTT
.* * * >
°« (31)
This condition (31) cannot be satisfied if both dk > and dk > 0,
aj dj
i.e., the post-entry expenditures on both advertising and distribution
cannot be higher than their pre-entry levels.
Case li : If M increases after entry and (p ~c) 6 M has increased, then
from (26) and (27), it is obvious that the inequalities in (28 and (30)
-17-
are reversed. The same logic as in case i applies and the result
follows.
Other formulations of response functions would not vitiate Theorem
1. But Theorem 2 would have to incorporate additional conditions
depending on the specific nature of the response functions. For example
if A(k ) = k /Ek
.
(us/everyone), then the optimal advertising and
31 31,31
i
distribution expenditures upon attack, will have to be found by solving
2(N+1) equations in 2(N+1) unknowns for all N + 1 products as compared
to 2 equations in 2 unknowns for each of the (N+l ) products in response
function models.
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